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SOME MISCONCEPTIONS OF
THE HONOR SYSTEM
I ASSURE you that I consider it a privilege and an honor to address you on
this occasion. I particularly appreciate
talking to such a large group of students
about student government. And it has
seemed to me that I can make no better
use of the time set apart for my discussion
than to present for your consideration what
I regard as certain misconceptions of the
honor system.
Among my many duties as a teacher of
philosophy is the very delightful one of conducting each year a course in logic. On
one occasion while conducting this course
I assigned to groups of students the task of
working out and bringing in illustrations
of the dilemma as a form of argument, and
the various ways of meeting this particular
form of argument. The dilemma brought
in by one of these groups was most interesting. It had to do with the honor system
and was designed to show that this institution ought to be abolished. As I recall it,
the argument went somewhat as follows :
If those who live under the honor system are
possessed of a high sense of honor, the system
is unnecessary and ought therefore to be abolished ; and if those who live under this system do
not possess a high sense of honor, it is impossible
to maintain the system, and it ought therefore to
be abolished. But those who live under the honor
system either do or do not possess a high sense of
honor. So that in either case this institution
ought to be abolished, either because it is unnecessary or because it is impossible to maintain
it.
All of which sounded very formidable,
indeed. But the arguments advanced to
meet this formidable dilemma were quite
equal to the occasion. On the one hand.
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it was contended that the alternatives proposed by the dilemma are not mutually exclusive, inasmuch as a student body is, as
a matter of fact, composed of both honorable and dishonorable types of students,
and that if only the former are in the majority, the honor system can and ought to
be maintained to the gradual elimination
of those who are unfit to live under it. On
the other hand, it was argued that the alternatives of honorable or dishonorable student
bodies are not only not mutually exclusive,
but that these alternatives are not exhaustive, inasmuch as there is a third possibility,
namely, a student body composed of those
who are neither entirely honorable nor dishonorable, but composed, rather, of those
who are in process of becoming honorable
or dishonorable, as the case may be; and
that with reference to any actual student
body, made up as it is of such immature
and unformed persons, the function of the
honor system is not only to regulate, by
eliminating the unfit, but also and more
especially to educate by helping to create an
environment which is most favorable to the
development of honorable traits and honorable behavior.
Now it occurred to me as I considered the
pros and cons of this debate, that these two
ingenuous methods of meeting what was no
doubt a purely academic attack on the honor
system are typical of two more or less distinct conceptions of the nature and function of this institution. One of these conceptions is that the honor system is primarily, if not exclusively, a form of student government; and the other is that,
because no form of self-government can be
permanently adequate unless it is educative
as well as regulative in its effects, the honor
system must aim at producing such effects
in the characters of those who live under it
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if it is to regulate their conduct in a permanently effective manner. It is the former
of these two conceptions, namely, the conception of the honor system as being essentially regulative rather than educative in its
intent, that I. regard as a misconception.
And it is this misconception of the honor
system that I wish you to consider first.
And let us begin by distinguishing between two meanings of the term "honor"
as used in connection with the honor system, which have not always been carefully
distinguished by those who have thought
on this matter. In the first place, then,
"honor" may be said to have an ethical
connotation in that it refers to those standards of action which are considered by the
members of any student community as being
indispensible to the welfare, if not to very
existence of that community. But the term
may also be said to have a psychological
connotation in that it refers to the traits
in the characters of those who make up the
student community which dispose them to
conform to such standards of action as
being matters of honor, and which we therefore think of as constituting their "sense of
honor."
Now the standards of action regarded by
any generation of students as being matters
of honor may or may not be truly objective,
that is, truly representative of their best interests ; but in either case the sense of honor
which many students bring with them to
college will on the whole fall short of the
requirements of the honor code under which
they must live. The reasons for this are
obvious. The student's sense of honor is
not inherited; it is acquired. And it is acquired in some specific environment. It
is, therefore, relative to that environment.
But the environments in which students are
reared and in which they acquire the sense
of honor they bring with them to college
are apt to differ from the college environment in one or the other, or in both of two
respects. On the one hand the ideals of the
former may be inferior to those of the lat-
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ter. On the other hand the two sets of
ideals may simply be different in that they
have developed with reference to dissimilar
situations and types of interest. And in
any case, influences must be brought to bear
on the immature student to improve, or if
that be unnecessary, at least to modify and
expand his "sense of honor" in appropriate
directions.
Now it is my conviction that the honor
system is, or at least should be, one of the
educative influences thus brought to bear
on the immature student. This is possibly
not the traditional conception of the nature
and function of this institution. The traditional conception would seem to be that
the honor system is essentially a regulative
instrument and, incidentally, a device for
separating the sheep from the goats, or a
sort of sieve for sifting out the good grain
from the worthless chaff. The presupposition back of such a notion of the honor
system is a static view of human nature,
and more especially of those elements in
human nature which constitute a "sense of
honor." But for a college which pretends
to be an educational institution to subscribe
to a system of student control which itself
makes no pretense to being educative in
its effects, and for the college to deal with
students as being immature or undeveloped
with reference to knowledge and yet as
being finished products with reference to
morals, would seem to be, to say the least,
a contradiction in terms.
And so I think we must conclude that
the college is logically committed to the
conception of the honor system as being
essentially educative and not merely regulative (or shall we say eliminative?) in its
intent and result. But what difference will
this conception make in the administration
of the honor system where it is consciously
grasped and put into practice? In other
words, how is the honor system to function as an institution whose aim it is to help
create an environment which is favorable
to the development of the sort of honor
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required of one who is to conform successfully to its code ? Time will permit of only
two or three suggestions in this connection
as illustrations of the sort of measures
which may be employed to accomplish the
end I have described.
The first of those suggestions is that the
freshman's acknowledgment and acceptance
of the honor code can be made somewhat
less perfunctory and mechanical than is
usually the case. When a student matriculates in a college where the honor system
is in operation, there is an implied agreement on his part to uphold its standards.
But this technicality might well be supplemented by a solemn and impressive ceremony, conducted by student representatives,
on which occasion all new matriculates
would be initiated into the honor system,
as it were, taking upon themselves such
vows in such terms as would be appropriate
to the emotional and dramatic features of
the situation. The psychological effect of a
ceremony of this sort is obvious.
Another suggestion I have to make in
this connection is that the publicity given
by student officers and leaders to the standards embodied in the honor code can be
made something more than perfunctory explanations and warnings. Too often such
publicity aims only at putting the new student on notice, so to speak. The usual attitude seems to be something like this : Here
are the ideals of the college community; let
the new student take them or leave them,—
along with the consequences ! A rather formal sense of justice (and should we not
add, something closely akin to smug selfrighteousness ?) requires that the inevitable
delinquents, when once their violations of
the honor code prove them to have been
"devils from the beginning," shall not be
able to plead ignorance of the law. Hence
the necessity of some sort of information
concerning the honor system and its standards. But my contention is that this information can and should be conveyed in such
a manner as to establish in the freshman's
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mind associations and attitudes which will
make his acceptance of the honor code
something more than a meaningless technicality. Constructive publicity, then, as a
substitute for perfunctory explanations and
warnings is another way in which the honor
system can be rendered truly educative in
its effects.
And there are various other methods
which might be employed with results
equally good, such as a more discriminating
and intelligent use of the "pledge"; and
such as the use' of corrective and constructive forms of punishment as opposed to
those forms which aim only at vindicating
and upholding the honor code and at ridding
the college of its undesirable elements. Our
time is passing, however, and I must hasten
on.
There is another prevalent misconception
of the honor system to which I wish to call
your attention. It has to do with what we
must regard as the very foundation of all
student government, namely, personal responsibility; and it usually manifests itself
in an unwillingness on the part of one student to assume responsibility for detecting
and exposing the wrongdoing of another.
What shall we say of such an attitude?
Well, there are several things, it seems to
me, which should be said with reference to
it. For one thing we shall do well, I think,
to recognize how prevalent this attitude is.
We shall also do well to recognize the sincerity of those who share it. Again we
might as well face the fact that this is the
point at which student government is most
apt to break down. And, finally, it is important for us to realize that many of those
who are opposed to the practice of informing on their fellows are able to give very
definite, and, as they see it, very convincing
reasons for the faith that is in them. After
a thorough investigation, extending over two
or more years, and conducted by means of
personal inquiry among many students, I
have come to the conclusion that those who
are opposed to this principle of reporting
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the misconduct of others fall into a number
of clearly marked off groups in accordance
with the reasons they give for the position
they take. I wish you to consider during
the time which remains two or three of
these reasons in order to determine, if possible, whether they have sufficient merit to
justify the position taken with reference to
it.
Some of these reasons are relatively superficial and need not, therefore, detain us.
I refer to such contentions as that the principle of informing on others is unnecessary;
or that it is extremely difficult and unpleasant; or that the punishment in which it results is too severe; or that the principle is
inherently odious. An argument which is
more serious and which merits more consideration is that the individual student is
not responsible for exposing the misconduct
of others because this duty has been delegated to a student council elected for this
purpose and authorized, therefore, to act
for the individual in this capacity. And in
defense of this attitude, an appeal is usually
made to the analogy which is said to exist
between civil society and the college community. In civil society there are agencies
whose sole duty it is to detect and expose
wrongdoing. To be sure, the existence of
such agencies does not absolve the individual
from all moral nor indeed from all legal
responsibility in this connection. That is
to say, there are situations in which the individual citizen is neither morally nor legally free to refrain from reporting to the
proper authorities the misconduct which
comes under his observation. But on the
whole, the welfare of society is best promoted where every citizen attends to his own
business. To attend to one's own business,
therefore, is under ordinary circumstances, an honorable trait so far as
the citizen is concerned. Now the college community under the honor system is like civil society in a democratic
state in that it sets up certain machinery
through which it proposes to govern itself.
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It is unlike civil society, however, (and here
the analogy between the two breaks down)
in that the personnel of its governmental
machinery are not primarily policemen or
judges, but are, on the contrary, students,
who in the nature of the case cannot be exclusively depended on to detect and expose
wrongdoing. Theirs is the duty to investigate misconduct and to administer punishment in such cases as come under their
personal observation, or such as are reported to them by others. For the most part
the rank and file of the students themselves
must be responsible for and take the initiative in holding to account those whose misconduct is dishonorable and thus strike at
the foundations of college life.
The tradition that "to tell" is not an honorable thing to do has a more primitive
basis, however, than this analogy between
the college community and civil society. It
reaches back into the earliest training of
the individual as a member of the family
and the elementary school. And, if I am
not mistaken, it is this training which all
of us get as members of the family and elementary school that accounts for the largest
group of those students who are adverse to
reporting the misconduct of others. And
yet there is no analogy between these more
elementary groups and the college community that justifies carrying over into the latter this tradition against concerning oneself
with the wrongdoing of one's fellows. For,
mind you, neither the family nor the elementary school pretends to be a self-governing body. On the contrary, authority is
vested in parents and teachers, respectively.
And on the whole parents and teachers find
it easiest to administer their authority in
an effective and equitable manner when
there is a minimum of "spying" or "tattling." But in a college where student government prevails, students are in a large
measure on their own responsibility and
must, therefore, be prepared to take the
initiative in upholding their honor code.
Let me hasten to remind you, however,
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that under the honor system the student is
not required to "spy" or to "tattle" or to be
a "busybody." He is merely required to
report such cases of misconduct as come
under his own observation while engaged
in his own affairs. And he is not at liberty
to withhold information of such violations
of honor for the reason that this information rightfully belongs to the student council to whom he as one who has elected to
live under the honor system has delegated
the task of upholding the honor code. The
fact that the knowledge in question was not
gained as a result of any effort on his part
but on the contrary was stumbled on, so to
speak, as one might pick up a purse lost by
another, does not in any way affect his
obligations in the matter. The knowledge
is not his; it belongs to others. To keep it
locked up in his own mind is no more defensible, morally, than it would be for one
to pocket money he had found with no attempt to identify its rightful owner. And
this is the reason that, under the honor system, to refrain from reporting violations of
the honor code is itself regarded as a breach
of honor.
There is one other objection to the principle of personal responsibility, as conceived under the honor system, to which I wish
to call your attention. There are many students who feel that to report or to threaten
to report the misconduct of another is, in
effect, to employ a degree of force which
is strangely out of place in a system of control based on honor. The criticism I heard
expressed most frequently at the recent
Congress of the National Student Federation was "too much system and too little
honor." Back of this criticism seemed to
be a feeling that it is inconsistent to regard
the standards of action included in the honor system as standards of honor when the
practice of the standards, so far from being
left entirely to the voluntary disposition of
students, is in reality guaranteed by coercive
measures of the most compelling kind. Has
this attitude, with the criticism it implies,
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any weight? And how is one who is concerned to uphold the reasonableness of the
honor system to meet it?
Well, it is possible that those who feel
so sure that honor and coercion cannot be
combined in any sort of system have overlooked or misconceived the real nature of
group self-control, of which the honor system in college communities is a special case.
Self-control by groups manifests itself in
two forms, namely, in morality and in law.
By morality is meant the control of the
members of a group from within through
personal ideals; and by law is meant the
control of such individuals from without
by means of legislative enactments enforced by agencies competent to inflict appropriate penalties for violations. But these two
forms of social control, although distinct in
their mode of operation, are by no means
mutually exclusive. For neither is possessed of a sphere of action peculiar to itself, in
which it operates to the exclusion of the
other.. On the contrary, the spheres of
action in which they respectively operate
overlap, so that a standard of action may be
both a matter of morality and a matter of
law. For example, driving an automobile
at a reasonable (or legal) rate of speed on
public highways is for some a personal ideal
(as well as a law) and operates, so far as
they are concerned, as an inner control;
for others, however, it is merely a law imposed from without and enforced by extraneous penalties.
Now, the honor system combines within
itself the two forms of control to which I
have referred as morality and law, and also
exhibits the overlapping of their respective
spheres to which reference has been made.
In other words, the honor system is, in,,
reality, a combination of coercion and honor. And the standards of action embodied
in its code partake of the nature of both
law and morality. For many students these
standards are personal ideals which exercise an inner control. For such students
the honor code is simply an announcement
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to the world of the principles they mean to have our unfinished areas, our weak molive by in the interest of certain values, ments, or both. It may be, therefore, that
felt to be fundamental in college life. And we all need from time to time to be rein living up to this announcement, no coer- minded lest we forget, to be enlightened
cion or restraint of any sort may be ex- lest we become confused, and to be made
perienced. There is a small minority of sober and steady in the face of what might
students in every college, however, for otherwise cause us to falter. And the exwhom the honor code is to all intents and istence of law and law-like coercions affects
purposes a legal enactment. Its standards, us in just these ways. Indeed, the law has
so far as these students are concerned, are been one of the great educators of the
not personal ideals; and the observance of human race, one of the schools, if you
these standards is not at all a matter of please, in which mankind's morality has
morality. For such students, on the con- been nurtured. There is a sense, to be sure,
trary, the control exercised by these stand- in which law may be said to represent the
ards is entirely external, and is enforced by institutionalizing of morality. But the law
the decrees of a council with penal powers. has more than repaid the debt it owes to
And yet, the existence of such an external the moral insight of the social genius in the
and coercive form of control within a sys- nurture it has provided for the morality of
tem which proposes to effect a control of the masses. And as an educative influence,
conduct primarily from within through a it is as indispensible for the average indisense of honor is, as we have seen, neither vidual of today as it was for the masses of
unusual nor unreasonable. In a group, made individuals in primitive society.
up of such a diversity of moral types as
The average college student, like any
compose the personel of a college commun- average individual, has his ideals and his
ity, only such a combination of law and convictions. But like any other average indimorality, coercion and honor, will suffice. vidual he is, with respect to goodness or
It must be obvious, however, that this character, an unfinished product. At colconception of a group, some of whose mem- lege he associates himself with other imbers are so moral as to require no control mature persons. Together, he and they
save through their own ideals and others of publish abroad the fact that they mean to
whom are so lacking in morality as to re- live by certain principles. These principles
quire control altogether from without, is constitute their code of honor. But iman undue simplification of the state of af- mature and idealistic though they be, stufairs actually existing in a college group, dents realize that some of their number are
or in any other community. In all groups, without much appreciation of what they
including the college, the dividing line be- ha've agreed to regard as matters of honor,
tween the "good" and "bad," or between and that all of them appreciate some of
the "honorable" and the "dishonorable" is these ideals but inadequately at best. They
fluctuating and indistinct. The great mass resolve, nevertheless, that these ideals shall
of individuals fall somewhere between these be maintained, whatever penalties must be
moral extremes, either because their ideals imposed to maintain them. Whereupon the
are not sufficiently inclusive to serve all the honor code ceases to be a matter of morality
vital interests of the group, or because these alone and becomes, in essence, at least, a
ideals, however inclusive they may be, are matter of law. But in the meantime no
not vigorous enough to function always violence has been done to the spirit of
without some support and reinforcement morality. On the contrary, morality has,
from without. And even the best of us, in reality, been supplemented and reinforcif we are but honest enough to admit it, ed; supplemented for those who are more
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or less lacking in the inner sanctions of
conduct, and reinforced for those the inner
sanctions of whose conduct may be in need
of that stimulus, enlargement, and support
which come only from a subjection to discipline which is self-imposed.
J. R. Geiger
TEACHING THE APOSTROPHE OF POSSESSION
HAD anyone told me when I first
began teaching that some day I
would admit that any single matter of form in written composition was hard
to teach, I know I should have been greatly
humiliated; and had I been told that I would
admit that the apostrophe of possession was
more than stubborn about getting taught, I
think I should have left the teaching ranks
at once.
Yet here I am after a number of
years of getting oriented in what "is
English"; of reconciling minimum essentials; of conducting classes in sight-seeing
trips through English and American literature; here I am, making an informal report
on how I attempt to teach the apostrophe
of possession! "Picking up pins" I should
have perhaps termed such work back there
a few years.
Had this particular bit of form—spelling,
perhaps—not run such a high percentage of
error in the numerous studies of recent
years of pupil errors in written composition,
I might never have known the mark was
poorly taught. Then had it not shown up
worst in a study of seven formal elements
I made of my own teaching, I probably
should not have given it any more thought.
But when this elusive will-o'-the-wisp
made the worst showing in my own teaching, I analyzed the nature of the mistakes
made in its use and discovered that my
forty-six sophomores—tenth-grade high
school—misused the apostrophe of possession in a series of dictation exercises in
which it was one of the problems, accord-
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ing to the following distribution of types
of errors.
57%, omitting the apostrophe
15%, placing the apostrophe after the j in singular nouns
12%, placing the apostrophe after the s in irregular plurals
8%, placin^ the apostrophe before the j in
plural nouns
6%, placing the apostrophe before the s in
singular nouns ending in s, as James
3%, unnecessary use of the apostrophe
2%, confusing the apostrophe with the comma
This bit of analysis caused me to plan a
definite method of attack on the apostrophe
of possession alone. Twice since, I have
done this, each time refining my method;
and not yet have I been able to take the
improvement, as shown by a closing-up test,
beyond a fifty percent improvement. However, I had evidence that attention had been
permanently directed to the pestiferous
mark. Each time that I have tried the experiment, I have had the individual cooperation of the pupils, who always seem
to puzzle as much about the elusive nature
of that apostrophe as I do about their slowness to capture it.
There are no less than ten different ways
in which a pupil may go wrong in the use
of that apostrophe of possession! I did not
know it until I began to isolate its uses for
the purposes of incorporating them in exercises for dictation. Briefly, these are:
(1) Omission of the apostrophe; (2) Its
unnecessary use; (3) Placing the apostrophe on top of the s; (4) Placing the apostrophe after the s when it should be before;
(5) Before when it should be after; (6)
In irregular plurals; (7) In nouns ending
in ^ all the time, as Charles; (8) In joint
ownership; (9) Confusing its with ifs;
(10) In possessive modifiers of gerunds.
The plan for the experiment is quite simple. It consists of an initial test of forty-five
sentences, arranged in cycles of nine; that
is, each group of nine sentences occurs in
the same order as does the first nine. This
test so arranged is for diagnostic purposes,
and for comparison with a similar one given
at the close of the experiment.

